John Passmore v. Joseph Iannello by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-14-2013 
John Passmore v. Joseph Iannello 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"John Passmore v. Joseph Iannello" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 672. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/672 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
BLD-255        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1599 
___________ 
 
JOHN PASSMORE, 
Appellant 
v. 
 
JOSEPH IANNELLO, CORPORAL AT ERIE COUNTY PRISON;  
JAMES S. VESHECCO, DIRECTOR OF CORRECTIONS/WARDEN AT ERIE 
COUNTY PRISON;MICHAEL HOLMAN, DEPUTY WARDEN AT ERIE COUNTY 
PRISON, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1:12-cv-00090) 
District Judge:  Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 23, 2013 
Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 14, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
PER CURIAM 
 John Passmore, a Pennsylvania state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals an order 
of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granting 
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summary judgment for the defendants in his civil rights action.  For the reasons below, 
we will summarily affirm.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
 Because we primarily write for the parties, we will only recite the facts necessary 
for our discussion.  On April 2, 2012, Passmore filed a civil rights complaint against 
Warden James S. Veshecco, Deputy Warden Michael Holman and Corporal Joseph 
Iannello.  According to Passmore, on February 23, 2011, while he was housed in the 
restricted housing unit (“RHU”)1 at the Erie County Prison (“ECP”),2 Corrections Officer 
Robert Tome ordered Passmore to present himself to take a mandatory shower, as 
required by ECP Policy 200-20.  The policy states: “Inmates in special management units 
have the opportunity to shave and shower at least three times per week.  (Inmates must 
shower on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday.)”  (Dkt. No. 16-3, p. 4.)  Passmore refused 
the officer‟s order, explaining that he was sick and that he had taken a shower the 
previous day. 
 Tome stated in his incident report that he ordered Passmore twice to step up to be 
cuffed for the shower, but Passmore refused.  (Dkt. 16-4, pp. 1.)  Tome notified 
Defendant Ianello of the situation, at which point he and Corporal William Niebling went 
to Passmore‟s cell.  (Id.)  According to Niebling, he ordered Passmore four times to come 
                                              
1
 The record shows that Passmore was placed in the RHU because he had an extensive 
history of misconducts in prison. 
2
 Passmore is currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institute at Forest in 
Marienville, Pennsylvania, serving a life sentence for murder. 
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to the cell gate to be handcuffed, but again Passmore refused.  (Dkt. 16-4, pp. 2.)  
Defendant Ianello then gave Passmore three separate orders to step up to the gate for a 
shower, but again, Passmore refused.  (Id.)  Ianello stated that he informed Passmore that 
if he did not comply with his orders, he would be sprayed with pepper spray.  (Dkt. 16-4, 
pp. 4.)  Passmore stated that he was refusing to follow the orders, at which point Ianello 
sprayed Passmore with pepper spray. (Id.) 
 Immediately thereafter, Passmore experienced severe burning on his body parts 
that were exposed to the pepper spray, and he claims that it felt like he was suffocating.  
He started banging on the cell door, but no one came to his aide.  He tried to use the sink 
in his cell, but the water had been shut off, allegedly pursuant to a prison policy requiring 
that water in the RHU be turned off whenever an extraction team is called.  According to 
Passmore, the extraction team arrived at his cell “20 minutes or more” after he had been 
sprayed, at which point he was removed from his cell and placed in a shower and a nurse 
put solution in his eyes.   
 As a result of the incident, Passmore claims that he sustained injuries including 
blurry vision, burning and red skin, breathing difficulty, and severe pain.  He alleges that 
he suffered from painful urination and that he could not see well for several days after the 
incident.  He claims that he put in three sick calls for his injuries.  In the complaint, 
Passmore acknowledges that he was treated on two subsequent occasions by the prison 
nurse, who flushed out his eyes with saline and told him to take showers to wash off any 
remaining pepper spray.   
4 
 
 Passmore alleges violations of the Eighth, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 
and he seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages.  Defendants 
filed a motion to dismiss, which the District Court treated as a motion for summary 
judgment.  Accordingly, the District Court provided Passmore with additional time to 
supplement his response.  After Passmore failed to do so, the District Court granted the 
Defendants‟ motion by order entered February 20, 2013.  Passmore timely filed this 
appeal. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over 
the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment.  Howley v. Mellon Fin. Corp., 625 F.3d 
788, 792 (3d Cir. 2010).  In considering the record, we “apply[] the same standard that 
the court should have applied.”  Id.  Summary judgment is only proper where no genuine 
issue exists as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  However, “[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is 
properly made and supported, an opposing party may not rely merely on allegations or 
denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must--by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule--set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(e)(2).  Furthermore, “[i]f the opposing party does not so respond, summary 
judgment should, if appropriate, be entered against that party.”  Id.  We may summarily 
affirm on any basis supported by the record if the appeal does not present a substantial 
question.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
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III. 
 Passmore claims that the Defendants‟ use of tear gas constituted excessive force in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.
3
  When considering an excessive use of force claim, 
a district court must consider whether force was applied in a “good-faith effort to 
maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically” to cause harm.  Hudson v. 
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992).  Courts look to several factors when making this 
determination, including (1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship 
between the need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of the injury 
inflicted; (4) the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably 
perceived by prison officials; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful 
response.  Id.  See also Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000).   
 As a result, use of tear gas is not “a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment. . . 
.”  Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270 (7th Cir. 1984).  Rather, “[t]he use of mace, tear 
gas or other chemical agent of the like nature when reasonably necessary to prevent riots 
or escape or to subdue recalcitrant prisoners does not constitute cruel and inhuman 
punishment.”  Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270 (7th Cir. 1984).  See also 
                                              
3
 Passmore claims that the Defendants used excessive force in violation of the Fourth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.  The District Court properly dismissed the 
excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment, as the Fourth Amendment applies to 
“[a]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force – deadly or not – in 
the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other „seizure‟ of a free citizen. . ..”  
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989), and Passmore was not a “free citizen” at 
the time of the incident.  Moreover, excessive force claims brought under the Fourteenth 
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Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 336 (9th Cir. 1988) (policy allowing use of taser 
guns on inmate who refused to submit to a strip search does not constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 195 (9th Cir. 1979) (the use of 
tear gas “in small amounts may be a necessary prison technique if a prisoner refuses after 
adequate warning to move from a cell or upon other provocation presenting a reasonable 
possibility that slight force will be required.”); Clemmons v. Greggs, 509 F.2d 1338, 
1340 (5th Cir. 1975) (the use of tear gas when reasonably necessary to subdue 
recalcitrant prisoners does not violate the Eighth Amendment). 
 Here, Passmore admits in his complaint that he refused to follow Corrections 
Officer Tome‟s and Defendant Ianello‟s directives to take a shower pursuant to prison 
policy.  In fact, the record shows that Passmore refused to present himself for a 
mandatory shower at least nine times before Defendant Ianello used pepper spray.  
Moreover, before Defendant Ianello resorted to using the pepper spray, he warned 
Passmore, giving him one more chance to comply.
4
  In light of these undisputed facts, the 
                                                                                                                                                  
and Eighth Amendments are analyzed under the same standard.  See Fuentes v. Wagner, 
206 F.3d 335, 347 (3d Cir. 2000). 
4
 In his complaint, Passmore alleges that Defendant Ianello used the pepper spray without 
warning.  (Dkt. 3, ¶ 21.)  However, he has not submitted any affidavits or other record 
evidence to dispute Defendant Ianello‟s contention that he gave Passmore fair warning 
before he used the pepper spray.  Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2), in responding to a 
motion for summary judgment, “an opposing party may not rely merely on allegations or 
denials in its own pleading. . .”  Thus, Passmore has failed to create an issue of material 
fact.   
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use of pepper spray was reasonable in these circumstances and the District Court properly 
granted the Defendants‟ motion.5 6   
IV. 
 Passmore claims that the Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights when 
they left him in his cell for at least twenty minutes without running water or medical 
attention after spraying him with pepper spray.  To prevail, he must demonstrate 
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 
(1976).  “To act with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is to recklessly 
disregard a substantial risk of serious harm.”  Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  For instance, a plaintiff may make this showing by establishing that the 
defendants “intentionally den[ied] or delay[ed] medical care.”  Id. (quotation marks 
omitted).  However, “[w]here a prisoner has received some medical attention and the 
                                              
5
 In his response to the Defendants‟ motion to dismiss, Passmore relies on Treats 
v.Morgan, 3908 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2002), to argue that the use of pepper spray in his case 
was excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  However, the facts in Treats 
are inapposite to the facts at hand.  In Treats, prison officers removed a radio from 
Treats‟ prison cell and he was asked to sign a form acknowledging that it had been taken.  
When Treats refused to take a copy of the form, a prison officer, without warning, 
sprayed him in the face with pepper spray.  Id. at 870.  In concluding that the force used 
against Treats was excessive under the Eighth Amendment, the Eight Circuit relied upon 
the fact that the officer violated the Arkansas Department of Correction‟s regulation 
requiring “an officer to warn an inmate and to give him a chance to comply before using 
any chemical agent on him.”  Id. at 870-71.  Passmore was given numerous opportunities 
to comply before Ianello sprayed him with the pepper spray.  Moreover, unlike the 
mandatory shower regulation at issue here, there was no regulation in place requiring 
Treats to take a copy of the property confiscation form.  See Id. at 872. 
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dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to 
second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort 
law.”  United States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette Cnty., 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The Defendants acknowledge the delay and attribute 
it to the time needed to assemble an extraction team.  As soon as the extraction team was 
ready, Passmore was taken to a shower and he received medical care.  Moreover, he was 
treated for injuries related to the pepper spray on two subsequent occasions.  We agree 
with the District Court that this does not amount to deliberate indifference to a serious 
medical need and, therefore, that summary judgment in favor of the Defendants was 
proper.
7
 
V. 
 We also agree with the District Court‟s dismissal of Passmore‟s Fourth 
Amendment claim.  Passmore argues that taking a shower is a personal, private choice, 
which is infringed by the mandatory shower policy.  While courts have acknowledged a 
prisoner‟s limited right to bodily privacy under the Fourth Amendment, see, e.g., Fortner 
v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 1993), no such right is indicated here and 
                                                                                                                                                  
6
 As discussed infra, the mandatory shower requirement does not infringe on any 
constitutional right, and we defer to the prison officials to formulate reasonable 
regulations in their prison. 
7Passmore alleges in his complaint that he heard one of the prison officers say, “let it 
marinate,” as they left his cell after spraying him with pepper spray.  However, he has 
offered no evidence, other than his complaint and his response to the Defendants‟ motion, 
to support this fact.  Thus, summary judgment was appropriate.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(e)(2). 
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Passmore does not have a constitutional right to choose when to shower.
8
  Furthermore, 
courts will generally not interfere with prison administrative matters and will afford 
significant deference to judgments of prison officials regarding prison regulation and 
administration.  See, e.g., Jones v. N. Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 
119, 126, (1977) (“Because the realities of running a penal institution are complex and 
difficult, we have also recognized the wide-ranging deference to be accorded the 
decisions of prison administrators.”).  Thus, Passmore‟s Fourth Amendment claim also 
fails. 
 Finally, the District Court properly dismissed Passmore‟s due process claim.  
“Conduct can violate substantive due process if it shocks the conscience, which 
encompasses only the most egregious official conduct.”  Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 
775, 782 (3d Cir. 2010).  Here, Passmore‟s allegations are based upon the same 
allegations as his Eighth Amendment claims of excessive force and deliberate 
indifference.  Because spraying Passmore with pepper spray and the ensuing delay were 
reasonable we cannot conclude that the Defendants‟ conduct “shock[ed] the conscience.”   
Id.   
 
 
 
                                              
8
Because no constitutional right is implicated, there is no need to analyze the four factors 
set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), which are used to determine whether a 
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VI. 
 For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented and we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  We deny 
Passmore‟s emergency motion for the return of money to his account without prejudice to 
seeking relief in the District Court after exhausting the appropriate administrative 
remedies. 
                                                                                                                                                  
prison regulation infringing upon constitutional rights is reasonable. 
